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Abstract
When is a belief justified? I consider three sorts of arguments for
different accounts of justification on the spectrum from extreme inter-
nalism to extreme externalism: arguments from intuitive responses to
examples; arguments from the theoretical role of the term in episte-
mology; and arguments from the practical, moral, and political uses
to which we wish to use the term. I focus particularly on the third
sort, considering arguments from Clayton Littlejohn (2012) and Amia
Srinivasan (2018) in favour of different versions of externalism. I offer
counterarguments in the same vein for internalism. I conclude that
we should adopt an Alstonian pluralism about the concept of justifi-
cation.
When is a belief justified? While it might well be true, as Dutant (2015)
claims, that few philosophers ever actually advocated the analysis of knowl-
edge as justified true belief, Gettier’s (1963) brief refutation of it was un-
doubtedly the catalyst for an enormous effort by epistemologists to under-
stand when a belief does count as knowledge, and of course part of that
involved understanding when a belief counts as justified, since most agree
that justification is required for knowledge. Since then, many putative an-
swers to the latter question have been proposed, and one of the central
points of disagreement that has emerged is between internalists and exter-
nalists. The debate is often set up with internalism as an extreme position
that says that only internal states of a subject are relevant to whether their
beliefs are justified, while externalism is just the negation of internalism,
covering any view that takes any external state to be in any way relevant.
But I think it’s more illuminating to array the various positions along a
spectrum, with extreme internalism at one end and extreme externalism
at the other. Where you lie on this spectrum is determined by the extent
to which the conditions that suffice for and are required for justification
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concern matters internal to the subject who has the belief and the extent to
which they concern matters external to them.
To illustrate this spectrum, let’s map out a few positions on it. First,
the most extreme internalist position. According to this, whether or not
you are justified depends only on your actual occurrent internal mental
states, such as the perceptual experiences you are having at the time the
justification of the belief is assessed, or memories that you are accessing at
that time. Mental states cannot make a difference unless they are not only
accessible to you but actually accessed at the time of evaluation. This is
what Pappas (2017) calls actual access internalism, but for justification rather
than knowledge. A slightly less extreme version permits mental states that
are accessible whether or not they have been accessed, such as a memory
that you could retrieve easily, even though you in fact haven’t. This is access
internalism. And a less extreme version still permits mental states that are
not even accessible to you, such as a feature you did not consciously notice
in a scene you just observed, but which you nonetheless registered at a
subconscious level. This is what Conee & Feldman (2001) call mentalism.
At the furthest externalist extreme is the claim—held by no-one, I think—
that a belief is justified just in case it is true. According to this, providing
your belief concerns only external matters, its status as justified or not is
determined entirely by external matters. Slightly less extreme than this is
process or indicator reliabilism (Goldman, 1979; Alston, 1988). Both appeal to
an internal state: the belief-forming process, much of which is internal, or
the grounds of the belief, which is often an internal state, such as a percep-
tual experience. But they consider mainly external features of those internal
states: the proportion of the beliefs that the process produces that are true;
the objective probability that the belief is true given that the subject has that
ground for it.
Closer to the middle of the spectrum, we have various hybrid accounts.
We might require, for instance, that the process by which you form your
belief is reliable, but also that you are aware of that process, understand
how it works to some extent, and your other beliefs support or at least
do not undermine the view that the process is reliable. Such a position is
neither purely internalist nor purely externalist.
In what follows, we’ll meet plenty of these positions. I am interested
here in how we might choose between them. After all, as they are usually
stated, they are rival accounts of a single concept of justification that many
people will have prior to engaging in systematic thinking about epistemol-
ogy.
The clearest inventory of arguments for and against internalism or ex-
ternalism about justification is found in the introduction to Clayton Lit-
tlejohn’s Justification and the Truth-Connection (Littlejohn, 2012, 1-61). The
arguments he enumerates there can be divided into three categories based
on the considerations they adduce in favour of the various accounts: in the
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first sort of argument, we appeal to the intuitive responses given by compe-
tent users of the concept when they are presented with particular cases; in
the second, we appeal to theoretical considerations from within epistemol-
ogy; and in the third, we appeal to the practical uses to which we would
like to put the concept, including moral or political uses.
Before we meet these arguments, it’s worth noting that they each have
a different target. The first sort of argument is given in the service of a
descriptive project. The aim is to map the borders of our existing concept
of justification, assuming of course that there is a coherent concept to be
mapped. The second sort of argument is also concerned with that existing
concept, but it is open to modifying it, perhaps quite substantially, in or-
der to make it better fit into the theoretical role we have written for it in
our epistemology. The third is much less concerned with the existing con-
cept, and more concerned with whatever concept might serve our practical
ends best. As a result, the three approaches could deliver three different
accounts of justification without thereby being incompatible. It might be
that the concept we actually use is not the one optimised for theoretical
purposes, and that neither are the most useful practically.
Let’s turn now to the arguments.
In the first category: Consider Richard, who grows up in a society in
which a false account of a particular period in its history is systematically
taught in the education system and bolstered by the media. He believes this
account. His belief is well supported by the evidence he has and there is no
evidence available to him that he has ignored. From the internal point of
view, his belief looks as good as it could; yet we intuitively think it is unjus-
tified. Or so Alston (1989) says, and he argues on this basis that internalism
gets this case wrong.
Or consider Nagi, who can very reliably detect fake Leonardo paintings,
but does not realise she has this ability and does not understand any of
the underlying mechanisms by which she does so. Standing in front of
a painting that the National Gallery ascribes to Leonardo, she forms the
belief that it is a fake. From the reliabilist point of view, her belief looks as
good as it could; yet we intuitively think it is unjustified. If that’s right, at
least the reasonably extreme reliabilist version of externalism must be false,
though more moderate versions are not affected (BonJour, 1980).
Or consider Chester. They stand in an art gallery, looking at a paint-
ing that appears to them entirely red. They are told by the gallery curator
that it is in fact a white canvas, but lit by red light. Nevertheless, Chester
persists in their belief, and in fact they turn out to be correct. Though typi-
cally an honest individual, the gallery curator was lying. We typically think
that Chester’s belief, while initially justified, becomes unjustified after the
gallery curator lies to them. And it is often thought that this makes trouble
for externalists, though the case is not clear cut (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2010).
Or consider Jane, who is a handless brain in a vat. Her experiences
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are all the result of inputs from malicious scientists who wish to convince
her that she lives in a world like ours, has hands, and so on. Like her
handed counterpart in the actual world, Jane believes that she has hands.
Intuitively, we feel that Jane’s belief is justified, perhaps because it seems
that her evidence is the same as her actual world counterpart’s. But the
externalist has a hard time accounting for this judgment. This is the New
Evil Demon objection to externalism (Cohen, 1984).
In the second category: we might argue in favour of externalism by
pointing out that only it can explain why beliefs formed in certain ways are
justified while those formed in other ways are not (Goldman, 1979). What
distinguishes beliefs formed on the basis of perceptual seemings and expert
testimony, which are typically justified, from those formed on the basis of
wishful thinking and implicit racial biases, which are typically not? Exter-
nal features of those belief-forming processes. Thus, we can only explain
why we draw the distinctions we do if we accept some form of externalism.
In favour of internalism, on the other hand, we might appeal to a con-
nection between our epistemic duties and justification. If I’ve done all that
could reasonably be asked of me epistemically speaking, surely my belief
is justified. But whether or not something can reasonably be asked of me
depends only on states that are accessible to me. For instance, you cannot
reasonably expect me to believe something if my accessible evidence makes
it very unlikely, even if my inaccessible evidence supports it. So internalism
must be true.
In this paper, I’m particularly interested in the third sort of argument.
Arguments of this sort appeal to the practical use to which we wish to put
the concept of justification, including its moral and political uses. Perhaps
the most well known argument in this category appeals to our use of epis-
temic concepts like justification when we assign blame to someone, either
informally or in the context of the law. Jeremy picks up what looks ex-
actly like his bottle of gin from exactly the spot where he’d put down his
bottle only an hour earlier; he pours Isaak a glass, and Isaak drinks it; un-
beknownst to both, Felix had earlier put Jeremy’s gin back in the cupboard
and absent-mindedly left his bottle of paint stripper on the worktop in-
stead in a bottle identical to Jeremy’s, and that is what Jeremy poured for
Isaak. Isaak becomes severely ill as a result (Williams, 1981, 102). Is Jeremy
to blame? To answer that, we might naturally ask whether Jeremy’s belief
that the bottle contains gin is justified. If it is, we might judge him innocent;
if it is not, we might not be so lenient. As in the case of epistemic blame
discussed in the previous paragraph, we might then reason that whether
or not I can be blamed for acting on the basis of a belief I have can only de-
pend on features of that belief that are accessible to me. I cannot be blamed
if, by some bad luck, there is an external feature of the belief—its falsity,
for instance—that was not accessible to me. Therefore, the argument con-
cludes, internalism.
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Clayton Littlejohn (2012) also offers an argument that belongs to this
third category. And he too is interested in what the concept of justification
must be like if it is to play the role we’d like it to play in our normative
theorising about actions.
I think we should [...] try to understand what is involved in
justification by trying to understand what is involved in prop-
erly relying on a belief for the purposes of practical deliberation.
(Littlejohn, 2012, 199)
But he draws an externalist conclusion, not an internalist one. Indeed, most
distinctively, he concludes that justification is a factive concept: if a belief is
justified, it is true. And he reasons to that conclusion by arguing that a be-
lief cannot justifiably be included in practical deliberation unless it is true,
and it cannot be justified unless it can justifiably be included in practical
deliberation. But what of Jeremy’s belief that he is pouring a glass of gin
for Isaak? Was that not justifiably included in his practical deliberations?
For Littlejohn, it was not. It may be reasonably or blamelessly or excus-
ably included therein, but not justifiably. And indeed Littlejohn is careful
to make room throughout for a notion of blameless or reasonable or excus-
able belief, and blameless or reasonable or excusable actions based on such
states. But, like Austin (1956), he insists these are different from the notion
of justified beliefs and the justified actions based on those states. Indeed,
if I read him right, he even accepts that it’s correct to say that Jeremy is
personally justified in believing that there is gin in the glass; what it is wrong
to say is that Jeremy’s belief is doxastically justified. So there is some sense
in which the belief is justifed—it is the belief of a subject who is personally
justified in holding it. But it is not itself doxastically justified (Littlejohn,
2012, 59).
Let’s consider one of Littlejohn’s central examples to see how the argu-
ment works. He presents two versions of his LOAN SHARK case (Littlejohn,
2012, Section 6.4.3). In each, a man approaches Harry. Harry believes that
the man is his nemesis, Bobby, who is intent on harming him. The man
looks exactly like Bobby. Harry pulls out a revolver and takes aim. In the
first version of the case, Harry’s belief is true, while in the second it false—
it is Bobby’s identical twin brother who is approaching Harry, and while
he looks mean, he has no ill-intent towards Harry. In the first but not the
second, Littlejohn thinks that Harry retains his right to non-interference
from a third party. That is, if Audrey were to use force to prevent him from
shooting the approaching man, he would have cause for complaint only in
the first case. And this, we might think, is because he was going to com-
mit a justified harm to the man in the first case, because it was an act of
self-defence, but an unjustified harm in the second case, because, though
Harry took it to be an act of self-defence, it wasn’t. And in order to deliver
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this result, we must ensure that our concept of justification renders the in-
dividual’s belief justified in the first case, but not in the second. Therefore,
externalism.
So far, then, we’ve met two arguments from this third category. In both
cases, they are concerned with the use to which we put the concept of jus-
tification for a belief when we are evaluating the normative status of an
action that is based on it. They come to opposite conclusions. I won’t try
to adjudicate the dispute here, not least because I will conclude later that
there is no need—both can be right. Instead, I turn to the next argument
from the third category, which is due to Amia Srinivasan (2018). Although
it does belong to this third category, it begins with an argument from the
first category. That is, Srinivasan presents three vignettes, in each case asks
us to agree with her intuitive evaluation of a particular belief held by the
protagonist in that story, and notes that only the externalist can match the
intuitive verdict.
RACIST DINNER TABLE Nour, a young British woman of Arab
descent, is invited to dinner at the home of a white friend from
university. The host, Nour’s friend’s father, is polite and wel-
coming to Nour. He is generous with the food and wine, and
asks Nour a series of questions about herself. Everyone laughs
and talks amiably. As Nour comes away, however, she is unable
to shake the conviction that her friend’s father is racist against
Arabs. But replaying the evening in her head she finds it im-
possible to recover just what actions on the host’s part could
be thought to be racist, or what would justify her belief in the
host’s racism. If pressed, Nour would say she “just knows” that
her host is racist. In fact the host is racist – he thinks of Arabs
as inherently fanatic, dangerous and backwards – and as a re-
sult did send off subtle cues that Nour subconsciously regis-
tered and processed. It is this subconscious sensitivity that led
to her belief that her host is racist. (Srinivasan, 2018, 2)
CLASSIST COLLEGE Charles is a young man from a working-
class background who has just become the newest fellow of an
Oxford college. He is initially heartened by the Master’s explicit
commitment to equality and diversity. The Master assures him
that, though the college is still dominated by wealthy fellows,
Charles will be welcomed and made to feel included. Indeed,
the Master tells Charles, he too is from a working-class back-
ground, and has experienced plenty of discrimination in his
time. Charles is confident not only that the college will be a
good community for him, but also that the Master is a person
of excellent judgment on these matters. However, a few inci-
dents soon disrupt Charles’s rosy view of things. At high table,
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when Charles explains that he went to a state school, a fellow re-
sponds with ‘but you’re so well-spoken!’. At a visit to the pub,
a number of young fellows sing the Eton boating song while
Charles sits uncomfortably silent. Finally, Charles hears that the
other fellows call him “Chavvy Charles”. Charles, who has a
dependable sensitivity to classism, goes to the Master to report
that he has experienced a number of classist incidents in college.
Shocked, the Master asks him to explain what happened. But
when Charles describes the incidents, the Master is visibly re-
lieved. He assures Charles that none of these are genuinely clas-
sist incidents, but playful, innocuous interactions that are char-
acteristic of the college’s communal culture. He tells Charles
that he is sure that Charles himself will come to see things this
way once he gets to know the college and its ways better. And
finally, he gently suggests that Charles is being overly sensitive
– something to which (the Master goes on) Charles is under-
standably prone to being, given his working-class background.
Charles leaves the conversation unmoved, continuing to believe
that he has faced classist discrimination in the college, and dis-
missing the Master’s testimony. Charles meanwhile is unaware
that some people from working class backgrounds (e.g. the
Master) suffer from false consciousness, distorting their ability
to recognise class-based oppression. (Srinivasan, 2018, 5-6)
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Radha is a woman who lives in rural In-
dia. Her husband, Krishnan, regularly beats her. After the beat-
ings, Krishnan often expresses regret for having had to beat her,
but explains that it was Radha’s fault for being insufficiently
obedient or caring. Radha finds these beatings humiliating and
guilt-inducing; she believes she has only herself to blame, and
that she deserves to be beaten for her bad behaviour. After all,
her parents, elders and friends agree that if she is being beaten it
must be her fault, and no one she knows has ever offered a con-
trary opinion. Moreover, Radha has thoroughly reflected on the
issue and concluded that, given the natural social roles of men
and women, women deserve to be beaten by their husbands
when they misbehave. (Srinivasan, 2018, 5-6)
Srinivasan asks us to agree that Nour’s belief that her host is racist and
Charles’s belief that the college is classist are justified, while Radha’s belief
that women deserve to be beaten by their husbands if they do not do as they
command is unjustified (just as Alston took Richard’s belief in the account
of the historical period to be unjustified above). And she argues that only
an externalist account of justification can deliver these judgments. Indeed,
it seems that only a reliabilist account can deliver the first judgment, while
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a wider range of views might accommodate the second.
So far, so familiar. We are used to this argumentative strategy from our
first category of argument. But, as Srinivasan points out, what is interesting
about these cases is that they are structurally the same as cases that are tra-
ditionally used to argue for internalism. That is, for each, there is a vignette
with what internalist and externalist will agree are the same epistemically
relevant features, but to which we intuitively react with a judgment that
only the internalist can match. The case of Nour is analogous to the case of
Nagi above. Just as Nagi had an extremely reliable eye for a fake Leonardo,
even though she doesn’t understand how it works or what features it de-
tects, Nour can reliably detect racism, even though she doesn’t understand
how or what features of the dinner party conversation led her to this con-
clusion. The case of Charles is analogous to the case of Chester above. Just
as Chester has a reliable colour sense, but is tricked by the usually trust-
worthy gallery attendant, Charles has a reliable nose for classism, but is
gaslighted by the Master of the college. And the case of Radha is analo-
gous to the case of Jane above. Just as Jane is fed only misleading evidence
about the existence of her hands, and has no access to evidence of her true
situation, Radha is fed only misleading evidence about the morality of do-
mestic violence, and has no access to evidence of the true moral situation.
Now, there are two ways to continue the argument from this point, and
Srinivasan considers both. On the first, it is an argument that lives solely
in the first category. Read thus, the externalist can use Srinivasan’s cases
to bolster their position if they offer a compelling error theory for the intu-
itions we have in Nagi’s, Chester’s, and Jane’s cases, while the internalist
can use this suite of cases to shore up their view if they can offer a com-
pelling error theory in the cases of Nour, Charles, and Radha. Srinivasan
considers one sort of error theory that the internalists might offer: they
might argue that, in the cases of Nour and Charles, we are loathe to say
something negative about someone who has experienced racism or clas-
sism, and thus feel uncomfortable declaring their beliefs unjustified in a
way that we don’t with Nagi or Chester; in the case of Radha, we are loathe
to say something positive about such a tragic case of internalised oppres-
sion, and thus feel uncomfortable declaring her belief justified in a way that
we don’t with Jane. That is, our intuitions might be swayed by the moral
weight of the situation in Srinivasan’s cases. Rightly, I think, Srinivasan
rejects this error theory. But it’s not obvious this is the only error theory the
internalist might offer.
What’s more, it’s not obvious that the error theory that Srinivasan of-
fers on behalf of the externalist for our reactions to Nagi’s, Chester’s, and
Jane’s cases really works. Let’s consider the first component of Srinivasan’s
error theory first. She notes that externalist responses seem most plausible
in cases characterised by what she calls ‘bad ideology’—that is, cases in
which the protagonist lives in a society throughout which pervades a sys-
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tem of false beliefs that serve to sustain certain social oppressions, and the
protagonist’s relevant beliefs are significantly influenced by this system of
false beliefs. And she attempts to explain why bad ideology cases provoke
this reaction by saying that, in such cases, we seek structural explanations
of phenomena, rather than individualistic ones, and externalism serves the
former sort of explanation, while internalism serves the latter.
Now, it’s not obvious that a positively-valenced normative concept like
justification is needed for the sort of explanation that Srinivasan seeks, nor
even that it plays that explanatory role well. That explanation might be
given better using a purely descriptive concept, such as the concept of a
reliably-formed belief. In situations of bad ideology, individuals who oc-
cupy a particular social position can pierce through the social lie because
their position bestows on them more reliable belief-forming processes con-
cerning the nature of the society they inhabit.1 While the fact that indi-
viduals can pierce the social lie is a good thing, it is nonetheless just a fact
that can be stated without normative language. And this suggests that we
should seek to explain it without such language, just as it is a good thing
that chloroquine kills the parasites that cause malaria, but we wouldn’t ex-
pect the explanation of that fact to include normative language.
Nonetheless, let’s grant Srinivasan her claim about such explanations.
This does not explain why our internalist intuitions in the case of Jane,
Chester, and Nagi are wrong, since they are not cases of bad ideology:
while Jane, Chester, and Nagi might well live in societies in which there
are pervasive systems of false beliefs propping up social oppressions, they
don’t affect Nagi’s beliefs about the provenance of paintings, Chester’s
about the colour of painting, nor Jane’s beliefs about her hands. Indeed,
Srinivasan’s explanation in terms of bad ideology seems to neatly account
for our different reactions to the two classes of cases without saying that
one is right and the other wrong. That is, it seems to point not to external-
ism as the conclusion, but to one of the following: first, we might say that
the concept of justification is disjunctive, so that in cases of bad ideology it
is externalist while in cases of good ideology it is internalist; or, second, we
might say that there are just two concepts here, so that there is an internalist
one and an externalist one, and we are interested in the internalist one in
cases of good ideology or where bad ideology has no causal effect, and we
are interested in the externalist concept in cases of bad ideology. Nothing
that Srinivasan says has ruled out these options.
Let’s turn now to the second component of Srinivasan’s error theory.
1See, for instance, Charles Mills’ explanation of why Black people in a White supremacist
society understand the racist nature of that society better than the White people in it. It
contains no normative language. “Often for their very survival, blacks have been forced
to become lay anthropologists, studying the strange culture, customs, and mind-set of the
‘white tribe’ that has such frightening power over them, that in certain time periods can
even determine their life or death on a whim.” (Mills, 2007, 17-8)
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She claims that the cases of Nour, Charles, and Radha are commonplace;
they are familiar and an all too prevalent part of our actual world. In con-
trast, the standard cases of clairvoyants (BonJour, 1980), deceptive artists
(Lasonen-Aarnio, 2010), or brains in vats (Putnam, 1981)—from which the
cases of Nagi, Chester, and Jane above are derived—are recherche´. From
this, she argues that our intuitions are likely to be more reliable in the for-
mer cases than in the latter. I have some sympathy with this error theory
when it applies to the original versions of the cases that I have presented
as Nagi and Chester; and I think it also casts doubt on the reliability of our
intuitions in the case of Jane. But the versions I presented at the beginning
seem reasonably commonplace.
Furthermore, even in Srinivasan were right, note that her point is only
comparative. She thinks that our intuitions in ordinary cases are more reli-
able than in recherche´ cases. It doesn’t follow, however, that our intuitions
in recherche´ cases are unreliable. Both might be reliable, but those in ordi-
nary cases more so. The comparative claim only tells against internalism
if we reject the pluralism about concepts of justification that I discuss and
endorse below. Only if internalism and externalism are competing to be
the single true concept of justification is the comparative claim a threat to
internalism. If we permit many concepts of justification, and if we accept
that the intuitions supporting internalism are reliable though less reliable
than those supporting externalism, then we might admit both concepts.
Now, as Srinivasan points out, we might try to go further than this
version of the first sort of argument, and instead establish externalism by
moving to an argument in the third category based on the cases of Nour,
Charles, and Radha. Perhaps we accept that the internalist makes no mis-
take in the case of Nagi, Chester, and Jane, while the externalist makes no
error in the case of Nour, Charles, and Radha. So, from the point of view of
our actual concept of justification, either it is disjunctive—sometimes inter-
nalist and sometimes externalist—or it is ambiguous between two concepts—
one internalist, one externalist—and we use the same word in different cir-
cumstances to refer to them. But, the externalist might argue, if we appeal
to the practical uses to which we wish to put the concept of justification, we
can discern a reason to favour the externalist concept of justification over
the internalist one. As Srinivasan suggests herself, correctly categorising
Nour’s, Charles’s, and Radha’s beliefs is politically important, and more
politically important, we might infer, than correctly categorising Nagi’s,
Chester’s, and Jane’s.
I am happy to accept all of this. But it doesn’t follow that we should
adopt an externalist concept of justification, and reject an internalist one.
To conclude that we must make two further assumptions. First, we must
be monists about justification. That is, we must assume that, at the end of
our investigations, we should end up with a single true concept of justi-
fication, rather than two or perhaps more. Second, we must assume that
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there is no practical or political purpose that internalist notions serve bet-
ter than externalist ones, and which we might place alongside the practical
and political purposes that Srinivasan takes to be played better by external-
ist notions than by internalist ones. I wish to argue that both assumptions
are mistaken.
Upon reflection, it surprises me that so few epistemologists have heeded
Alston’s call for pluralism about the concept of justification (Alston, 2005).
On this view, there are a number of concepts that have equally good claim
to be our concept of justification and there is no concept that has a bet-
ter claim than these. That is, the upshot of the lengthy debates about the
nature of justification is that it doesn’t have a single nature. ‘Justification’
is thus a polysemous term; the concept it refers to fragments into many
different concepts. Some of those are internalist, some externalist: access
internalism might be one, process reliablism another, and a third might be
a hybrid view on which a belief must be reliably formed and must cohere
with the subject’s other internally accessible attitudes before it is justified.
These different concepts might serve different ends. An internalist concept
might serve our purposes when we want to decide whether or not to blame
someone for something they did on the basis of their beliefs; a hybrid con-
cept might be required for determining whether an individual has a right
to non-interference in a particular situation; and an extreme reliabilist con-
cept might serve our political end of giving structural explanations of how
someone breaks through bad ideology to furnish themselves with true be-
liefs about their oppression.
Part of what is surprising about the lack of support for pluralism is
that it seems the natural response when competent users of the concept—
as I assume analytic epistemologists of the past fifty years to be—disagree
so irreconcilably on certain of its basic features. And indeed philosophers
have been quick to give this response in other situations. Suppose I take a
coin out of my pocket and tell you it is a trick coin, biased either towards
landing heads or biased towards landing tails. You say the coin is just as
likely to land heads as to land tails. Are you right? Many will say yes,
and many will say no. In this case, we resolve the standoff by saying that
there are two concepts of probability in play. The first is epistemic, the
other ontic. The first measures something like your degree of confidence,
and on that concept, it is right to say that the coin is equally likely to land
heads or tails, for my confidence in each outcome is the same. The second
measures something about the world independent of our knowledge of it,
and on that concept, it is not just as likely to land as tails. Indeed, it is
either biased towards heads in which case it is more likely to land heads
than tails, or it is biased towards tails in which case it is more likely to land
that way than the other. These two versions of the concept of probability
have been distinguished and even given their own names: ‘credence’ for
the epistemic concept and ‘chance’ for its ontic cousin.
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Indeed, it’s worth noting that philosophers have already divided the
very concept of justification, though in a different way from the one that
is proposed here. If I have evidence for a belief, but I’ve formed the be-
lief not on the basis of that evidence but on the basis of wishful thinking,
for instance, we say that my belief is propositionally justified but not dox-
astically justified. And we met the notion of personal justification above,
when we were discussing Clayton Littlejohn’s view of excusable beliefs. So
we already countenance different versions of justification. Why not also
countenance internalist, externalist, and hybrid versions?
I think there are two plausible explanations—and neither excludes the
other. On the first, proponents of each analysis of justification think that
there are already terms that cover the concepts picked out by the alterna-
tive analyses on offer. For instance, Littlejohn is often quick to point out
that the concepts reasonable or excusable or rational often apply in those cases
to which the internalist would like to apply the concept justified. And an
internalist or a proponent of a hybrid view, might think that simply calling
something ‘reliably formed’ suffices to cover the cases the reliabilist would
like to capture. If this is right, there’s no need to split the concept of justifi-
cation. Better to use the concepts that we already have.
One problem with this is that the alternative concepts offered usually
don’t match up. For instance, most internalists typically don’t consider
everything that is excusable to be justified. If a belief is implanted in my
brain without my realising, it is excusable, but not justified; similarly, if I
calculate something quickly because I need to make a decision and I make
a small error in my calculation, my resulting incorrect belief is excusable,
but again not justified. Another problem is that different parties to the de-
bate understand the various concepts in different ways. For instance, Stew
Cohen (2016) is happy to equate rationality and justification, while Clay-
ton Littlejohn (2012) is not. And I think Littlejohn is right. For those who
count the boundedly rational among the rational, a belief formed on the
basis of a base rate fallacy, for instance, might very well count it as ratio-
nal because formed by a method that proves reliable in our evolutionary
niche, but most will agree that it is not justified. So the other concepts are
no less problematic than the concept of justification, and skirmishes at their
borders are no more tractable.
Another explanation is that each party to the dispute thinks the con-
cept of justification plays such a crucial role in our reasoning about certain
important matters that it might be positively dangerous to hand over con-
trol of its use to one of their rivals. Suppose, for instance, you accept the
following: if someone is justified in believing that the person approach-
ing them means to harm them, then anyone who stops them defending
themselves against this perceived impending harm is violating their right
to non-interference. Then it’s going to be extremely important to you to
ensure that the concept of justification does not fall under the control of the
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internalists. The worry is that the concept of justification is embedded in
many important practical or legal inferences. And if that is so, we must
seek a single concept that makes these inferences valid.
This worry is really a practical one. It raises a concern not about the
Alstonian pluralist view itself, but rather about the practical consequences
were it to be accepted widely. But just as there is a practical problem here,
so there is a practical solution. We need only ensure that those inferences
that use the term in moral and legal thinking are amended to invoke not the
ambiguous concept of justification, which contains many different precise
concepts within it, but rather the precise concept that ensures the inferences
go through. Even if you imagine that this solution could not practically be
implemented, that is no mark against the philosophical position behind it.
People are often still unable to distinguish clearly between epistemic and
ontic notions of probability, but that makes the distinction between them
no less valid.
In sum: I don’t think there are good reasons to resist pluralism about
justification. This, then, opens the door to a view on which there are legit-
imate internalist, externalist, and hybrid versions of the concept of justifi-
cation, perhaps answering to different intuitions, perhaps playing different
theoretical roles in our epistemology, perhaps serving different practical,
moral, or political ends. On this view, an internalist notion of justification
need not serve a practical, moral, or political end at all in order to be in-
cluded in our suite of justification concepts. And it certainly needn’t serve
a more important such end than the end served by an externalist notion. It
might instead earn its keep by systematising a certain collection of robust
intuitions, or by playing a much-needed role in our epistemological theo-
rising. But I nonetheless want to argue that there are such practical, moral,
and political ends that internalist concepts play.
Here’s the first. We use an internalist concept of justification to signal
that a person’s beliefs or actions are internally coherent, rationally compre-
hensible, based on foundations that they take to be correct, even if they’re
in fact mistaken. And that is useful because it allows us to predict their fu-
ture behaviour. If I see someone behave in a way that is incomprehensible
to me, but learn that they are internally justified in doing so, I learn that
they must have beliefs that support or rationalise that behaviour, and that
allows me to predict how they will behave in other situations. One weak-
ness of reliabilist concepts of justification, for instance, is that learning that
someone’s belief is justified tells us little about their other cognitive states.
It tells us only about the relationship between that belief and the part of the
world that it concerns.
So there are pragmatic benefits to including the internalist concept of
justification that go beyond its use in assigning blame. But these are not
specifically political benefits to match those catalogued by Srinivasan for
the externalist concept. To see that there are those sorts of benefits too, we
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need look no further than the sort of case that Srinivasan herself considers.
First, we need to introduce the notion of an epistemic weapon, and to
do that, we need the notion of an epistemic harm. So, what is an epistemic
harm? We might think of it exactly by analogy with our account of other
sorts of harm. Thus, just as we might say that I harm someone in the usual
sense if I do something that causes them to have lower all-things-considered
utility—that is, less of what they value overall—than they would have had
if I had refrained, so we might say that I epistemically harm them if I do
something that causes them to have lower epistemic utility—that is, less of
what they value, epistemically speaking—than they would have had if I
had refrained. We then say that an epistemic weapon is a means by which
an agent—whether an individual, dominant group, or whole society—can
cause epistemic harm to a target—whether an individual, an oppressed
group, or a whole society.
Now, epistemic goods—such as knowledge, true belief, understand-
ing, wisdom, and evidence—are unequally and unfairly distributed within
our society. This is due partly to the inequities of our education systems,
the prevalence of hermeneutic epistemic injustices, and unequal access to
shared evidence, public debate, and the tools for individual theorising. But
it is also due to the effects of other, more local epistemic weapons. A crucial
part of a radical epistemological project is therefore to develop effective de-
fences against those weapons. And, to do that, we must understand how
different weapons work. But, as I will now argue, we need the internal-
ist concept of justification in order to usefully categorise different sorts of
epistemic weaponry in the service of this task. And thus that version of
the concept plays an important political role, just as Srinivasan argues the
externalist concept does.
Consider Nour and her racist host, and Charles and his classist college
and its apologist Master. Both are, in different ways, targets of the epistemic
weapon of gaslighting. In both cases, they successfully defend against the
weapon. But in both cases they are threatened by it. While it doesn’t in fact
inflict an epistemic harm, it could easily have done.
In both cases, what makes them potentially vulnerable to gaslighting is
a hermeneutic injustice—or, perhaps better, it is simply that they lack an im-
portant concept or a body of evidence that would allow them to understand
their experience in a way that would make them better able to withstand
gaslighting. Nour has the concept of racism, but she does not understand
from the inside what are the features of behaviour that typically indicate
the presence of that phenomenon, or perhaps she can access an inventory
of those features, but does not understand why they indicate what they
do. Charles is better equipped in some ways. He has the concept of clas-
sism, but he also knows what indicates its presence, understands how it
works, and so on. What he lacks is the concept of false consciousness and
the empirical knowledge of how that usually manifests in society. Nour’s
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epistemic poverty makes her vulnerable to gaslighting herself. She has this
gut feeling that her host was racist. But without understanding why, or
whether the gut feeling is reliable, she might easily second guess herself
and decide her judgment is not sufficiently internally justified to retain it.
If she abandons this true belief, she’ll suffer an epistemic harm, since a true
belief is an epistemic good. The epistemic weapon will have done epis-
temic damage. Charles’s epistemic poverty is less severe than Nour’s, and
as a result he is largely safe from gaslighting himself. But it does make him
vulnerable to gaslighting by the Master of his college. Without the concept
of false consciousness, and with the evidence that the Master takes there to
be no classism, he might feel his belief is no longer internally justified and
abandon it. If he does, he’ll suffer an epistemic harm. Again, the epistemic
weapon will have hit its mark. Thus, in both cases, the efficacy of the epis-
temic weapon relies on the targets responding to their evidence by forming
or retaining only those beliefs that are internally justified.
Now consider a new case. In it, an unscrupulous prosecutor is present-
ing his case in a murder trial. Having found DNA at the murder scene,
the police took DNA samples from all 100,000 people living in the town
and tested each for a match. The first person they randomly selected was a
match according to their test, and they arrested him and put him on trial.
Now, this test gives 1% false positives and 1% false negatives. Thus, if the
defendant had a prior probability of 1100,000 of being guilty, then they only
have a posterior probability of around 11,000 after incorporating the evidence
of the match.2 But the prosecutor knows that most jurors will neglect the
base rate and conclude from this evidence that the defendant is 99% likely
to be guilty. So he mentions the match between the defendant’s DNA and
the DNA found at the crime scene, and he mentions the false positive and
false negative rates of the test used.
Again, this is an epistemic weapon. Here, it is deployed to ensure that
the jury convicts. If they ignore the base rate and conclude that the defen-
dant is 99% likely to be guilty, they might well take that to put the matter
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in this case, the efficacy of the epistemic
weapon relies on precisely the opposite response from the one on which
gaslighting relies. Gaslighting relies on targets responding to their evi-
dence in a way that is internally justified. This weapon, which exploits
2After all, by Bayes’ Theorem,
P(Guilty |+ve) = P(+ve |Guilty)P(Guilty)
P(+ve |Guilty)P(Guilty) + P(+ve |Guilty)P(Guilty)
=
0.99× 0.00001
0.99× 0.00001 + 0.01× 0.99999
≈ 0.001
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our tendency to commit the base rate fallacy, relies on them responding in
a way that is internally unjustified.
There are many dimensions along which epistemic weapons might dif-
fer. Does it target your concepts, or your evidence, or your beliefs? If it’s
your beliefs, does it try to implant a false belief or does it try to remove a
true one? If it’s your concepts, does it try to impoverish your concepts or
make the ones you have ambiguous? If it’s your evidence, does it try to
keep information from you or overwhelm you with conflicting and com-
plex information that swamps your cognitive capacity? But they also dif-
fer in what makes an individual vulnerable to them: Do they form beliefs
about the relevant subject matter in a way that is internally justified or not?
And it is easy to see that different policies will serve to defend groups and
individuals against these different varieties. The concept of internal justifi-
cation, therefore, earns its stripes on the radical side in the political battle
against epistemic weaponry.
In conclusion: we should be pluralists about our concept of justification.
‘Justification’ is a polysemous term, and there are many precise concepts
that fall under it. These different concepts play different roles. Some cap-
ture a particularly widespread set of intuitions, such as when a mentalist
concept covers the cases of Nagi, Chester, and Jane above; or an externalist
concept captures the case of Richard, Nour, Charles, or Radha. Some play
an important theoretical role, such as when internalism accounts for epis-
temic blame, or externalism explains why certain foundational beliefs, such
as those formed on the basis of experience, memory, or testimony are justi-
fied. Some play a practical role by pinning down the concept we need when
we are ascribing blame, or the one we need when determining whether a
person’s right to non-interference has been violated. And finally some fur-
ther a radical political cause by providing structural explanations of how
individuals can pierce through bad ideology, while others further that same
cause by helping differentiate different sorts of epistemic weapon so we can
better build defences against them.
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